This paper provides an analysis of the UK's future Competition Policy, following its withdrawal from the EU. It is focused on whether the UK should make greater use of public interest tests in merger regulation, implement industrial policies aimed at protecting UK industries, or allow antitrust rules to diverge from those of the EU. We find that some of the new freedoms achieved by Brexit will be damaging to competitive markets. It may be necessary to legislate to limit these effects.
Introduction
In the months following the referendum to leave the European Union, it has become clear that the UK is heading towards a 'Hard Brexit'. Drawing on two of the three most highprofile debating points of the Brexit campaign, the Conservative Government has interpreted the vote to mean that there will be red lines against free movement of people into the UK and an end to the supremacy of EU law. 2 These red lines provide our definition of Hard Brexit. The implication, confirmed by numerous European Commission and Member State leaders, is that the UK can no longer be a member of the European Single where the arrangement or merger has a Union and EEA dimension. 4 EEA Members are also subject to the same State Aid rules and jurisdiction of the CJEU. 5 'Hard Brexit' rules this out.
A central argument of this paper is that the consequences of a hard Brexit must be understood in the wider context of a revival of interest in Industrial Policy. The financial crisis, economic slowdown and stagnation of real wages over the last eight years have undermined confidence in the economic system, including the ability of competitive markets to provide the best economic outcomes. Instead of interventions only to restore or extend competition, politicians from both ends of the political spectrum are beginning to believe that government should use more instruments for intervening in market forces. The 3 Those in favour of Brexit focussed on the economic arguments of mutual benefit from free trade to suggest that free access to the Single Market would continue, but these were never likely to trump the political and legal arguments. 4 This means the arrangement, conduct or merger affects more than one EU or EEA member. See EEA Agreement [1994] OJ L1/1, arts 55-57. Where cases have an EEA-only dimension, they are dealt with by the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA Court. 5 EEA Agreement (n 4), arts 61-64. Article 61 is the equivalent of Article 107 TFEU. On the status of CJEU jurisprudence, Article 105(2) of the EEA Agreement states: 'The EEA Joint Committee shall keep under constant review the development of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the EFTA Court. To this end, judgments of these courts shall be transmitted to the EEA Joint Committee which shall act as to preserve the homogenous interpretation of the Agreement'. In addition, Protocol 34 to the EEA Agreement allows the EFTA court to ask the CJEU to decide on the interpretation of an EEA rule. UK Government, under Prime Minister Theresa May, has announced it will review the public interest regime in UK merger control and consider greater controls on foreign investment. 6 Perhaps most tangibly, she created a Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the third element of which is suggestive of intervention or planning at a level that has not been seen in the UK for decades. 7 This department sponsors and oversees the UK's independent competition authority, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) which is responsible for the primary enforcement of competition law. In addition to the Government's apparent shift towards greater interventionism, Jeremy Corbyn, leader of the opposition Labour party, is hostile to free markets and EU State Aid rules, explicitly advocating industrial subsidies and state ownership. 8 In the context of these cracks in the pre-crisis consensus on the benefits of competition, and the return of pressure for public interest interventions from both wings of the political spectrum, this paper examines some of the implications of 'Hard Brexit' for competition policy. After some background on current UK policy and the regime that it replaced, this paper focuses on three issues: (i) public interest tests in merger control; (ii) state aid to help British firms; and (iii) antitrust enforcement. By exploring these three areas, the paper identifies several new freedoms that the UK could utilise to shape its competition policy outside the EU, but also warns that these freedoms entail a number of costs -it may even be desirable to legislate limits to some of them. The paper cautions against changes to UK competition policy without very strong justification. Any move towards a more interventionist approach, or a significant divergence from EU competition rules, would risk future negotiations on access to the Single Market, the efficient development of UK-based firms, and investment in the UK. A common criticism directed at the UK merger regime during its formative years was that the concept of the 'public interest' was kept intentionally broad and ill-defined.
Background
Governments were reluctant to draft a more precise definition because of fears it would excessively restrict the scope of the competition authority's inquiries. 9 This created uncertainty and inconsistencies between merger decisions. 10 Moreover, these statutory shortcomings were further compounded by additional anxieties expressed towards the regime's use of ministerial decision-making, which embedded an inherent subjectivity at the heart of the assessment process. that economics based effects tests are mainly about protecting consumers by controlling concentrations of economic power and avoiding monopoly and cartel outcomes. The test is also clearly focused so all parties can reasonably predict the issues that will be addressed. 24 Notwithstanding this effects-based approach, the merger provisions of the Enterprise Act retain a limited role for public interest considerations, which afford a basis for the Secretary of State to intervene in merger assessments. 25 Under section 57, the CMA Board has a duty to notify the Secretary of State where it believes a merger raises a public interest issue specified in section 58, including: (i) national security, (ii) certain issues relating to media plurality and the presentation of news, and (iii) stability of the UK financial system.
Moreover, subject to the approval of Parliament, 26 the Secretary of State can add to this list of public interest criteria. Indeed, this occurred during the financial crisis when the Government added (iii) to the explicit list of public interests so it could force through the merger of Lloyds and HBOS, even though it raised competition concerns. 27 So, in principle, the Government can keep adding to the list of public interest considerations without the need to pass an Act of Parliament.
While the current UK antitrust enforcement regime has been fairly uncontroversial, calls for greater public interest scrutiny of mergers have been gaining momentum in recent years, driven by fears surrounding the perceived ease with which foreign firms acquire UK businesses. 28 In particular, some fear the lack of government protection and intervention is resulting in job losses and asset stripping. Perhaps the starkest illustration of this was Kraft's acquisition of Cadbury plc in 2010, which -despite commitments from Kraft to the contrary -was later followed by the closure of the Cadbury Somerdale factory with a loss of 400 jobs. 
Public Interest Tests in Merger Regulation
The stage is set for the public interest regime in UK merger control to undergo its most substantial reforms in over a decade. Within a few weeks of the new Prime Minister assuming office, her Government indicated its intentions to: (i) subject foreign takeovers to case-by-case scrutiny to determine whether their transaction is in the 'national interest ', 33 and (ii) review the public interest regime under the Enterprise Act 2002 and to introduce 'a cross-cutting national security requirement' for ownership of critical infrastructure. 34 It is evident that the underlying philosophy of these proposals is to safeguard the public interest by subjecting foreign bidders to harsher scrutiny -a departure from the existing public interest test, which does not directly discriminate between foreign and domestic firms. 35 This raises a number of important questions concerning the way in which these legal 38 A merger will amount to having a Union dimension if it exceeds prescribed turnover thresholds; ibid art 1(2). Such a merger will be prohibited if it significantly impedes effective competition. 39 Conceivably, a large-scale public interest merger could fall within the UK's jurisdiction if the transaction meets the 'two-thirds' rule; ibid, art 1(3). 40 EUMR, art 21(4). 41 Article 21(4) provides a non-exhaustive list of three legitimate interests: public security, media plurality and prudential rules. The provision has experienced a somewhat turbulent history, plagued by acts of protectionism, which has led the Commission to treat Article 21(4) requests with great suspicion. 42 In particular, the measures should be proportionate, non-discriminatory and necessary in the absence of less A return to the uncertainty witnessed under the old broad public interest regime is clearly undesirable, especially as it would multiply Brexit risks. The current economic effects-based 43 However, the UK would not be entirely free to determine its own public interest regime because any trade agreements entered into by the UK would likely contain safeguards against any practices that might be seen as discriminating against foreign firms. Finally, hard Brexit would end 'one-stop' merger control, 54 so if a merger involving a UK firm also has an EU dimension, it will be subject to separate investigations by the European Commission (under the EUMR) and the CMA (under the Enterprise Act 2002). This duplication will be costly for firms and will put further stress on the CMA's budget. If this is not increased, and if there is no increase for the added complexity of public interest issues, then the resources available for high quality merger assessment will be reduced with adverse effects on the clarity and predictability of merger decisions. programme with a view to reducing bureaucracy and focusing as much as possible on economic effects. The aim has been to look more positively at aid which may help growth but to strengthen enforcement against aid which may distort trade in the Single Market.
State Aid and Industrial Policy
Upon leaving the EU, the UK will no longer be subject to European State Aid rules. In principle, this frees up Government policy to provide greater assistance to industries it wishes to promote or protect. However, it will still be subject to WTO In this context, it is useful to recall the main reasons why national governments adopt the apparently paradoxical position of wanting both to grant state aid to firms located in their territory, and to submit to international rules that limit their ability to do so. The first set of reasons is that submitting to controls of their own behaviour is the price that must be paid by some Member States to attract multinational firms (or their profit flows) away from more efficient locations (or where profits have been generated).
The above reasons relate to the advantages of rules that limit the ability of other countries to subsidise in ways that put a government's home firms at a competitive disadvantage. A second set of reasons why national governments might want state aid rules relates to selfcontrol. Huge lobbying efforts and political pressure can result in 'irrational' subsidies being conceded, especially if that pressure comes from a marginal constituency or in the run-up to a general election. 56 In this context, it can be advantageous for a government to credibly tie its hands so that it cannot grant subsidies for short-term political gain. It greatly reduces lobbying pressure if everyone knows that there are clear limits as to what aid can be offered. 57 An important example of the type of aid that is tightly controlled by the EU state aid regime, and which will be far easier to grant post-Brexit, is rescue and restructuring aid (R&R aid).
Aid to firms in difficulty puts a brake on the normal process by which the most innovative and efficient firms see their market share grow because they better serve the needs of consumers, while their less productive competitors shrink and possibly exit the market.
Recent economic research confirms that much of productivity growth can be attributed to shifting market shares from less productive to more productive establishments. However, this insight is sometimes unpopular because it can be misrepresented as doctrinaire and even callous as closures have serious implications for individuals and their families. It is entirely appropriate to use public funds to help redundant workers to re-skill and ease economic transition, but it is not wise to subsidise senior managers (who may have been responsible for the financial difficulties) and shareholders (who may live in comfort elsewhere). For example, the prospect of subsidies can incentivise reckless behaviour by senior managers in weak firms, and the prospect of subsidies for a weak rival reduces the 56 There may also be other political reasons why state aid is granted. See, for example, Mathias Dewatripont and Paul Seabright '"Wasteful" Public Spending and State Aid Control' (2006) 4(2-3) Journal of the European Economic Association 513. 57 Similar concerns used to be raised in connection to monetary policy before governments across the world realised that a more stable economy could be achieved by putting monetary policy in the hands of an independent national bank.
incentive for efficient rivals to compete. 58 The discipline provided by EU R&R state aid control, which is allowed only in limited circumstances and subject to incentive safeguards, is therefore systemically important for the nurture of efficient competition.
The key questions for Brexit are, first, whether an independent UK is able to limit state subsidies in other countries as effectively as the EU, and second whether future UK governments have the self-discipline to replace the credibility of an independent European
Commission to limit the lobbying for subsidies in their own territory. The current UK political context discussed in Section 1 of this paper suggests that the second is unlikely, and a hard Brexit, without the UK being subject to enforcement by the CJEU, suggests that remaining EU members may be reticent to allow free access to the single market without very strong safeguards against potential UK state aid. The EU will also be less concerned if EU subsidies harm UK rivals. In short, the freedom from European state aid control is likely to come at considerable cost and it may be better to find ways to commit to limit that freedom.
Antitrust Enforcement
Chapters TFEU, which is highly questionable given that the UK criminalised its cartel laws specifically to strengthen the deterrent effect of its existing administrative provisions. 62 In addition, information exchanged with other EU competition authorities (discussed below) cannot be used by the receiving authority to impose custodial sentences. 63 The UK's withdrawal from the EU will allow the CMA to investigate international cartels that currently only fall under the jurisdiction of the European Commission and end the obligation to apply EU Law alongside national competition law. In principle, this will boost its ability to employ the criminal cartel offence.
However, the UK's freedom to shape its own prohibitions and enforcement strategies outside the EU also comes at a cost. 64 Although that information cannot be used for evidence in a criminal prosecution that could result in a custodial sentence, the receiving authority can use it to guide its own criminal investigation. 65 When the UK leaves the EU (and assuming it does not join the EEA), it will have to replace its ECN membership with bilateral agreements on cooperation and the exchange of information. 66 This includes many such agreements currently entered into by the European Commission on behalf of EU Member States, either explicitly on competition or as part of trade agreements. While these arrangements can be very effective for informal communication and merger clearance, they do not generally allow for the exchange of any confidential information without the consent of the relevant parties. 67 Consequently the CMA will receive less information from its European partners about potential infringements, at a time when it will have to replicate the European Commission's international enforcement activities, to ensure the UK Treasury continues to receive its cut of the very significant Antitrust fines currently levied by the Commission. 68 While the UK has no way of preventing its departure from the ECN, there is a second cost to its new freedom that it does have some control over: the potential loss of consistency between UK and EU competition rules. Internationally there has been a gradual harmonisation of substantive rules and enforcement tools. Nevertheless, there is a real danger of divergence, not so much in the treatment of hard-core horizontal cartel arrangements, but in relation to horizontal conduct at the fringes (for example, whether an arrangement has the 'object' of restricting competition or should be subject to an 'effects' analysis) and to the treatment of vertical arrangements that currently benefit from EU block exemptions.
The obvious benefit of ensuring consistency between competition rules in the UK and the EU, is that it would minimise the cost to businesses of operating in both jurisdictions. The UK could adopt into domestic law any EU block exemptions that currently affect the scope of Chapter I, Competition Act 1998. In addition, the UK's Competition Appeals Tribunal (CAT) has already built up a significant body of case law that reflects the jurisprudence of the CJEU. The problem is that continued consistency would require the CAT to be guided by decisions of the CJEU after the UK has withdrawn from the EU. As with State Aid rules, consistency may be demanded as a condition of access to the Single Market, but this is at odds with the political imperative to "take back control" and cease being bound by the decisions of the CJEU.
While there is no suggestion that CJEU judgments should be binding on UK law in the event of a 'Hard Brexit', there is equally no reason why it should not be strongly persuasive in guiding the CAT. Indeed, EU Competition Law jurisprudence guides judicial decision-making around the world, because so many competition prohibitions are based on those of the EU. 69 This has contributed to the gradual convergence of competition rules internationally, through bodies like the International Competition Network. In addition, it is not unusual for UK courts to be guided by, or indeed, to adopt precedent from other parts of the Commonwealth. 70
Concluding Remarks
The analysis in this paper suggests it would be unwise to substantially amend competition policy in the UK, as part of its withdrawal from the European Union. The current regime provides a high degree of predictability and transparency to businesses operating and investing in the UK. A continued commitment to this regime would help mitigate some of the great uncertainties surrounding the UK's future relationship with the EU. Until the Brexit vote, the UK was a strong voice against advocates of wider public interest and distorting 69 Brexit will provide the UK with an opportunity to be more interventionist in domestic industries, subject to WTO rules. But an industrial policy that is based on more frequent public interest interventions in mergers, and assisting specific industries with state aid, makes policy susceptible to lobbying, subjective decision-making and short-term political point scoring. History has shown that it is better to be cautious with such interventions and that an economics-based merger control system, administered by an authority that is independent of political interference, is the most effective approach. The current merger regime already allows for public interest considerations, but only in exceptional circumstances (national security, media plurality and stability of financial markets).
Following Brexit, the UK Government will be able to employ these existing considerations in any merger where there is a political need to protect UK firms from foreign acquisitions on these grounds. Any move to introduce an expanded public interest test alongside the competition test, risks dragging the UK back to the patchy and inconsistent policy of the past. In fact, it may be better to legislate to make the extension of public interest grounds more difficult.
Overall, it is in the UK's interests to remain broadly aligned with current EU Competition Policy and to avoid a divergence in substantive antitrust rules. This is important for keeping uncertainty to a minimum and averting unnecessary increases in the regulatory burden for firms operating in the UK. Policy shifts that compound Brexit uncertainties risk long-term damage to the efficiency, flexibility and dynamic success of UK firms and markets.
